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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah

STATE OF UTAH,
)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

MERLYN CLEGG STARLEY,
\
Defendant and Appellant.

CASE
NO. 19,363

l

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Defendant was convicted of resisting arrest.
ant prays for reversal or a new trial.

Defend-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Much of the evidence is conflicting. The State called
as its witnesses the arresting officer, an officer who was

summoned to the scene of the arrest, and the accomplice.
The defendant testified in his own behalf.
The arresting officer testified that he observed the
defendant and the accomplice committing an act of sodomy
ln a parked automobile (Tr. 36). He waited until the au-
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tomobile proceeded and then pulled it ov
er (Tr 40) t
defendant walked back to the officer's aut · . · 1••
omobile ast
why he was stopped, requested to obtain his ke ' t.
- -~
. .
. _
ys, return,
t o th e po1ice vehicle where he was placed in th i... ·
e l.liiCk SE'
and the accomplice was
- ·~ placed
_ in the- front seat (Tr··'

47). "."'ithout w~g'._ t~e defendant' Pulled an obj~tjr:
the officer and sqUirted him with a substance and a SC11/t1
ensued (Tr. 48). The officer admitted that he was dr'll'U·L
an unmarked vehicle (Tr. 55) . He also adRii·tt@G u.,~
the defendant names (,Tr.- 57).

The ~ant denied the act of sodomy (Tr. 68\. ~.
testifie¢. "_:At no time did I hear a siren. No siren 11 ,
sounded. The car next to nre was- untrm'rlted. There 11'•
no indication of who it· might be, or h0\\t Imf111 people therr
may have been in this automobile. The driver jum~
out in an aggressive manner, came over to my car ani
grabbed for the door, and- it was not locked, so he pull~
it open and at ttlat paiht,.. r. ~ bac~of the sea.t whell
I had this atomizer of this irritant and squirted him, am
I
he averted his face so it caught him on one side and \l'f
Kriow most" or the rest" (Tr. 64). ffe stated' ttlat he rarried the atomizer for protection, since there llad ~"a'
series of muggings.in Salt Lake' (Tr. 65). Defendant~
never been arrested before (Tr. 63). On cross-examL'IE·,
tibit det'emant said; "W~; acttta:lly ttle> mooient f. my car· and- turned on my lights then he turned mIll
J:igftt:s·· and' me white- light rlght ~ of me; ant ~ ~
left. It was a stmulttureans- thing: I ttrtnk he· was j1lll
•ttt· ..i..:..-tac*" I'll
trying to· surprise-us; and unnerve us- WI · us..,

71.')·.

.
.
r,f·The acromplke also denied the aet of sodlllY·

3
upon the prosecuting attorney proceeded to use a . .state-

ment, allegedly obtained from the witness for the alleged
purpose of refreshing his memory (Tr. 80). Earlier the
defendant had testified that this statement had been "wrung
out of" the accomplice (Tr. 67). The accomplice testified
that the statement was not true. He stated: "I did not
give it Mr. Sexton through his own vicious mouth took
it down. I never once said that what he had written down
was correct. He wrote it from his own mind . . ." (Tr.
Sl;, . The court overruled defendant's objection, stating
~hat the statement "hasn't been offered in evidence" (Tr.
81).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT 1
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DETERMINE
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE STATEMENT WAS
OBTAINED UNDER DURESS.
The case of People vs. Hiller, 2 ill. 2nd 323, 118 N.E.
2d 11, was a prosecution for rape. The Illinois Supreme
Court held that it was error to permit the prosecution to
cross-examine from a statement claimed to have been ~
tained by coercion, where there was an undetermined
claim that the prior statements or admissions of a defendant were given under force and duress.
POINT 2
TIIE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY TO IMPEACH HIS OWN WITNEsS UNDER THE GUISE OF REFRESIIlNG HIS MEMORY.

The case of State vs. Leek, 85 Utah 531 39 p
•
'
. 2d l()S•
was a pro:;ecution for forgery Error was
·
t
·
assigned Wh
the trial court p2rmitted counsel for the state to. ~
·
gat e i"t s WI·tnesses by direct
and leading questions mtenu.
. .
.
.d
ana rr
rece1vmg m ev1 ence a written statement purp·ort d
··
e to have
been made and sworn to by the witness and for the pur.
pose of impeachment of him.
This Court held that there must be a showing th&!
counsel has been misled or entrapped. Here there was nr
such showing and a new trial was ordered.

The Supreme Court reasoned:
"Here the imp2aching document was especial1'.
damaging as the very thing sought to be establishej
by the document was corroboration of the acccmplice
requiring direct evidence, which was sought to be secured by way of impeaching one's own witne3s. The
fact that the witness stated out of court, certain mat·
ters which, if competent proof, would tend to show
the defendant's guilt, do2s not establish the existenll'
of such matters as facts. After counsel, and for thz! 1
matter the court, had discovered that the witness waE
not inclined to help the cause of the state, or did not
intend to testify to anything adverse to defendant> ,
cause, it was improper for the District Attorney to
pursue the examination and thereby secure affinna·
tive testimony prejudicial to the state and then make :
use of the situation thus created for the p\ll'POO' o!
securing by impeachment affirmative testimony favor·
able to his cause by showing that the witness had made ·
statements out of court and out of the presence of .th'.
. diCI~
defendant, although written, which were preJU
to her." P. 1095, 1096.
In State vs. Herrera, 8 Utah 2d 188, 330 P. 2d lOSli.
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the defendant was prosecuted for rape. The prosecuting
attorney repeatedly cross-examined the defense witness relative to certain charges and arrests, as he thumbed through
same papers. No official records were offered to substantiate the implicacions arising from them nor was the disposition of any charges or arrests given.
In reversing and remanding the case, this Court stated:

"If the line of cross-examination indulged here were
to \:::~ permitted., the accused would find himself in a

wilderness without witnesses, since none would volunteer the truth nor would the truth flow free under
compulsory process, a witnese knowing the extent to
which he could be subjected to questions not pertinent
to the issu2s involved, but designed to destroy his veractiy by the simple device of calling attention to a series of incidents in his past life, perhaps harmless per
so, p2rhaps true but having nothing to do with his
truthfulness or the lack of it." P. 1087.
The Court wmt on to point to another ground which
constitutfd prejudicial erroT:
"The same sort of objection to such procedure can

be levelled at the attempted impeachment of the ~

cution's own witness. a physician, who testified that he
saw no evidence of abrasions on the limbs of the prosecutrix, only to be called to account by the prosectItion through questions implying that he had made an
official report to the contrary, thus casting the doctor
in the role of prevaricatOT-\\ithout offering W introduce such report of evidence (which was ava.ila.ble)".
P. 1087. Emphasis added by the Court.
·
In People vs. Zammora, 66 Cal. App.2d 166, 152 P.2d
180, 1944. a prosecution for homicide, the court found error

6
in permitting the District Attorney while examinin
.
g a11'1.
ness f or t h e state, to call the witness' attention t
·

.
.
otheorr
c1al transcn.pt of the Grand Jury and proceeded
.
.
to rea1
therefrom, it appearmg from the line of que ti
s ons P't·
pounded that the District Attorney was not attem tin·.
.
.
.
p gt,.
reconcile a variance with former testimony or to relrei
an absent recollection, but rather to impeach the witne£:
The court stated:
"If the purpose of the examination is to reconcile
or examine testimony, the memory of the witness ma·
be refreshed, but if it is to contradict or discredit lli~
present testimony of the witness and to have the l'On·
tradiction stand unreconciled and unexplainro, then ;1
is impeachment, and a pretense of refreshing the mem.
ory by reading former testimony can not be made a
subterfuge to get before the jury incompetent e~.
dence or statements which aid the case of the pro;e.
cution." P. 206.

POINT 3
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE PRO·
SECUTING ATTORNEY TO ASK QUESTIONS RELATING TO CRIMES NOT IN ISSUE.
Sta~ vs. Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 266, 382 P.2d 407, 196'.:
was a prosecution for assault with intent to commit mur·
der and robbery. Defendant had made statements to an
· carcerated
F. B. I. agent after he had been arrested and m . 'bl·
but for other crimes. The only pertinent, and admiSSJ e,
th t he ·vas
statement by the defendant to the agent was a '
• ti"
of the defense,
an accessory to the fact. Over obJeC ons
ti!'
. .
f
the agent the en ~
the prosecuting attorney ehc1ted rom ·

7
conversations he had with the defendant, which included
questions relating to various crimes.
The court held this to be prejudicial error. "It implied that the defendant was implicated in other crimes,
none of them proven, and could have no other effect than
to degrade the defendant and give to the jury the impression that he had a propensity for crime." P. 409.

CONCLUSION
The defendant was tried for the crime of resisting ar-

rest. The record shows, however, that in fact the defendant was prosecuted for sodorey. Without claiming
surprise the state was permitted to impeach its own witness by a statement obtained under duress, not for the
purpose of proving the charge of resisting arrest but to
establish that the infamous crime against nature had been
committed. This created an unfavorable and prejudicial
image of the defendant before the jury.
Respectfully submitted,

DAVE McMULLIN
20 East Utah Ave.
Payson, Utah
Attorney for Appellant

